With the U.S. and China competing for influence in Southeast Asia, how secondary states in the region make their foreign policy choices has come under more scrutiny. It seems secondary states in the region have exerted strong will and capacity to maintain significant amount of freedom in choosing their foreign policy orientations, rather than being totally dictated by the great powers. This paper presents a detailed paired comparison of Myanmar and Thailand's alignment policies and their consequences since the end of World War II. The paper argues that international structural factors certainly constrain the options for secondary states, but domestic politics often play a significant role in how political leaders make the alignment choices they do, which is heavily conditioned by how these leaders derive their political legitimacy. Thus, to explain the alignment choices of secondary states in Southeast Asia, we need to pay more attention to the intertwined nature between domestic political contestation and foreign policy making.
Introduction
The rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in recent decades has generated considerable strategic anxiety among the many concerned parties. As the current major power, the United States, one of whose main concerns is maintaining primacy in the Asia Pacific region, has sought to strengthen its existing security alliances while rebalancing its strategic focus to the Pacific. 1 Particularly in Southeast Asia, member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been under growing pressure due to the great power rivalry in the region. On the one hand, the competition between the two powers makes foreign policy decision-making more complicated, because trying to balance economic and military concerns while juggling competing domestic and international interests is no easy task. On the other hand, however, challenges apart, such competitive pressure also carries the potential to create more opportunities for these secondary states to optimally achieve their national interests.
2 the United States. 8 Vietnam, which also has ongoing territorial disputes with China, has seen increasingly converging security interests with the United States. Yet, Hanoi still maintains its 'Three-Nos' foreign policy of not forming of military alliances with foreign powers, disallowing foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil, and not allying with one country to counter another. 9 Finally, a few months after being elected, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines announced, to the great surprise of many, the country's economic and military 'separation' from the United States in order to pursue a more independent foreign policy and carry out economic cooperation with China. 10 On reviewing the recent foreign policy choices of such Southeast Asian countries, it seems that these secondary states have exerted a strong will and displayed a capacity to maintain a measure of freedom in choosing foreign policy orientations, rather than meekly following those imposed by the great powers. There was little such 'freedom of manoeuvrability' during the Cold War period. The structure of US security alliances in the region at that time maintained close-knit political, economic, and military ties to avert the threat of communism. But although countries in the alliance structure benefited from US security protection, it imposed significant constraints on their diplomatic relations. Thailand and the Philippines, for instance, did not recognise the PRC until 1972, when the United States and China reached the rapprochement that initiated bilateral relations between them, and the withdrawal of American troops from Indochina became imminent. Thus, it was no coincidence that both Bangkok and Manila recognised Beijing only a few months after Vietnam's reunification in April 1975. Looking back at the changes that took place over that period, how may we explain the context under which secondary states made their foreign policy choices, and the consequences that would follow with respect to the national interests of those countries?
To answer these two questions, this article presents a detailed comparison of the alignment policies of two Southeast Asian countries-Myanmar and Thailand-since the end of World War II (WWII), and the impact of these policies on the national interests of these countries. I have selected Myanmar and Thailand for this comparative analysis for the following reasons. First, both are located on the mainland of Southeast Asia, and neither has ongoing territorial disputes with China. They are also of a similar size as regards territory and population. Myanmar has a total territory of 676 578 sq km, and Thailand of 513 120 sq km. As of 2017, Myanmar had a total estimated population of around 55 million, and Thailand's was around 68 million. 11 Having each experienced different historical encounters with European imperialism, the two countries have adopted distinctly different foreign policy orientations in the post-war period. Thailand allied closely with the United States at the start of the Cold War, while Myanmar remained mostly neutral throughout its post-independence years. They were, in addition, two of the three countries in Southeast Asia (the other being Malaysia) to which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided active support during the Cold War for their communist insurgencies. Thailand and Myanmar hence constitute suitable case studies for an examination of how two countries of similar geo-strategic importance have pursued quite different foreign policy choices and the impact of such choices on their national interests.
The article starts with a general theoretical explanation of the alignment policies of secondary states, and a brief historical background of Myanmar and Thailand prior to the start of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. The empirical content comprises three diachronic comparisons between these two countries. The first compares the extent of economic and military aid the respective countries received during the Cold War and the intense competition between the PRC-led communist forces and US-led anti-communist bloc in Southeast Asia. 12 The second comparison is of the way in which the two countries dealt with domestic communist insurgencies from the mid-1960s onwards under the context of the regional geopolitical reshuffle. The third comparison focuses on the post-Cold War period, and how each state sets out to withstand external pressure from the great powers and maintain autonomy in the wake of their respective regime changes.
The article argues that although international structural factors certainly constrain the options open to secondary states, domestic politics also play a significant role in political leaders' alignment choices, and these are largely determined from what their political legitimacy is derived, and often rooted in the countries' political histories. This is particularly true of secondary states that are former colonies and were hence historically dominated by external powers. The long duration of authoritarian governments in many developing countries, along with domestic political instability due to factional fighting, also contribute to the prominence in their leaderships of idiosyncratic factors. 13 Ultimately, however, the alignment policies of secondary states are made through a mutually constitutive process by virtue of their domestic politics and external environment. 14 In such two-level games, statesmen make decisions on their alignment choices via a complex web of strategic opportunities and dilemmas that are shaped by international structural constraints and domestic political cleavages. Once made, alignment policies have direct impact on these states' national interest. When competition between great powers intensifies, and if a secondary state decides to seek a close alliance with a particular great power, it will stand to benefit from that power's security protection and economic assistance. This makes such an alliance arguably the best option for the secondary state. However, if the secondary state opts to stay neutral or isolate itself, it runs the risk either of being abandoned by the outside world or punished by the great powers. On the other hand, if competition between great powers is on the whole moderate, and if a secondary state pursues engagement with two or more great powers, it may then exploit the healthy competition between them to play one off against the other. This is the choice that will best serve its national interest.
Secondary States' Alignment Choices and Their Impact
The focus of mainstream International Relations (IR) literature is invariably on the great powers. As Thucydides once observed, ' The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.' 16 Great powers, with their immense capabilities, have historically exerted preponderant influence over the international system, which accounts for the partiality of the conventional IR literature, especially that in the realist tradition, towards them. 17 However, the vast majority of countries in the world are not great powers. Therefore, IR literature that is derived largely from the experiences of great powers might not offer an adequate explanation of the comparative alignment policies of secondary states. A more appropriate approach would be one that is better attuned to the circumstances of secondary states insofar as their being relatively constrained by a general lack of power capabilities and the specific logics of their domestic politics.
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Existing literature on secondary states' alignment policies examines certain specific dimensions. The first is the effect that various types of international systems exert on secondary states' alignment choices. 19 Particularly among many realist scholars, one common assumption that secondary states are most constrained by external structural factors. 20 Robert Rothstein, for example, argues that when great powers are, 'more concerned with maintaining what they have than with attaining something new', secondary states may then achieve security, but at the expense of influence. 21 When great powers become competitive with each other, however, this creates more room for these states to manoeuvre.
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Michael Handel raises the similar argument whereby the manoeuvrability of secondary states' foreign policy is largely a function of the nature of the particular international system to which they belong. In a competitive system, secondary states have the chance to manipulate the great powers and so advance their interests, whereas those in a hegemonial system are dominated by the great power in its particular sphere of influence, and thus lack autonomy. 23 Indeed, levels of international competition relate closely to the ways secondary states can realise their national interests. 24 It seems that secondary states' alignment choices are heavily constrained by international structural factors. As Lin points out in his study on Chinese support for North Vietnam during the Cold War, this patronage relationship was heavily contingent upon China's power rivalry with the Soviet Union and the United States. 25 However, others contend that structural explanations are overly deterministic, and instead draw attention to domestic factors that explain variations in secondary states' alignment choices. Annett Baker Fox, for example, in her seminal work on the neutrality of several small European states, argues that geostrategic factors together with diplomatic skills explain how these states managed to resist pressure from great powers and remain neutral during WWII. 26 To contribute to the burgeoning literature on secondary states' foreign policy choices in Southeast Asia, this article compares two mainland Southeast Asian states-Myanmar and Thailand-focusing on their alignment choices since the end of WWII. By providing a diachronic comparison of these two countries over this long duration, the article aims to identify how these two countries of similar size and geostrategic importance pursued different alignment policies under the structural constraints during and after the Cold War, and to explain how we can evaluate the implications of these alignment policies for their respective national interests.
Comparison of Myanmar and Thailand's Alignment Choices
As the only country in Southeast Asia to have escaped colonisation, Thailand (formerly known as Siam) retained a degree of sovereignty by conferring extraterritoriality on foreigners and exploiting the rivalry between the British and French, as well as by ceding large areas of peripheral territories over which it had formerly claimed suzerainty. 33 Although Thailand collaborated with the Japanese during WWII, 34 the post-war government under the leadership of Pridi Banomyong emerged relatively unscathed from the shadow of that war. 35 However, the country's domestic political instability, manifested in the power struggles between Field Marshal Phibun Songkram and Pridi Banomyong in a series of coups and counter-coups, drove both parties to seek international support to consolidate their domestic position.
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In contrast to Thailand, Burma was colonised by Britain through three wars, and eventually became a province of British India. Initially supported by Japan, but later turning against it, nationalist groups under the leadership of Aung San demanded independence from Britain upon its return to Burma after Japan's defeat. After achieving independence, the Burmese government faced tremendous challenges in consolidating its control over the country due to the militarisation of its society during the Japanese occupation, 37 and in dealing with the conflict between strong Bamar (the main ethnic group) nationalism and restive ethnic minorities which, fearing Bamar domination, sought selfdetermination. 38 Therefore, since the end of WWII both Thailand and Burma needed to deal with internal challenges and strong divisions of power, as well as the looming communist threat in Southeast Asia after the communist victory in China. Thailand and Burma responded quite differently to the American position, borne of its focus on countering the spread of communism in Southeast Asia to prevent a 'domino effect' in the region. Thailand chose to engage closely with the United States by forming an alliance early in the Cold War period, and only started to improve relations with Beijing after the Sino-US rapprochement in the early 1970s. The Burmese government, meanwhile, initially tried to balance the two great powers through an open neutralist foreign policy, but later switched to self-isolation to distance itself from the competition ongoing between them since the early 1960s. Why did these two countries pursue such different foreign policy choices, and what were the implications of them for their national interests?
Foreign Aid during the Cold War
Thailand's alliance-oriented foreign policy stands in sharp contrast to Burma's studied neutrality. After ousting Pridi in 1948 to become Thailand's Prime Minister, Phibun, with the help of the coup group, actively carried out domestic political reshuffles, and sought international support to reward the army for its support. After the PRC was founded, the Thai government perceived Beijing as its largest external security threat, partially based on its fear of the anti-monarchist, 44 In return, in August 1950, the World Bank, under the auspices of the United States, approved US$25 million in development aid for Thailand-the first funding it had ever authorised for an Asian country. 45 In addition, Thailand offered itself as a base for American covert operations against China. Through Operation Paper, Thailand helped the United States to arm the Kuomintang (KMT) forces positioned in Burma's Shan states, whose mission it was to invade and retake China's Yunnan province. 46 Key figures in Thailand's military and police forces, including Phibun, Phao, and Sarit, benefited personally from the US military aid the country received to back these covert activities against China, and also from the lucrative opium trade in which the KMT engaged. 47 Indeed, by 1954, when the Unites States established Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Thailand had become the key base for American anti-communist activities in Southeast Asia. The United States thus bestowed on Thailand, its ally, and key Thai politicians considerable institutional and material benefits. Furthermore in return for large quantities of military aid, Thailand allowed the United States to construct military bases on its territory to support US military campaigns in Indochina, as shown in Table 1 .
Burma, in contrast to Thailand, whose alliances translated into significant material benefits, was less fortunate as regards American financial aid. Burma's geostrategic position was certainly crucial to American efforts to counter the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia. As Clymer points out, citing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sources, 'In the early 1950s, the United States considered Burma to be nearly as important to the security of Southeast Asia as Indochina.' 48 However, the United States willingness to give aid to the Yangon government was continuously hampered by a combination of factors originating in Burma's official neutral foreign policy position.
Burma desired American economic and military assistance, but was wary of signing anything that would be interpreted as tying it to one camp in the Cold War. Since its independence in 1948, the Burmese government had steadfastly upheld a neutralist foreign policy that was a direct result of its colonial history, whereby its subjugation under British rule had become the foundation of Burmese nationalism. Thus, the ability to make its own foreign policy without outside domination became a fundamental component of its post-colonial independence. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu said in his speech at the National Press Club in Washington in July 1955, 'Our recent existence with great powers is such that in the minds of the people of Burma an alliance with a big power immediately means domination by that power.' 49 The Burmese government also worried that agreeing to American aid would imperil its economic relations with the PRC. 50 Only after several rounds of negotiations did the two sides agree on the terms under which the Burmese government would receive aid from the United States. However, the amount involved was modest in comparison with US aid to Thailand, as shown in Table 1 .
Military aid to Burma was also negligible. 51 Although Burma expressed interest in updating its military system, the Americans, despite their willingness to help in this respect, were heavily constrained by the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1951 (Battle Act), which prohibited American aid to, 'any country supplying strategic materials to communist countries'. As Clymer points out, '[J]ust how to provide assistance without entering a normal military agreement produced immense bureaucratic headaches, which only became worse when it became clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed military aid. They objected to Burma's neutral status and questioned the need for assistance.' 52 Although Burma's neutralist foreign policy stance did not earn it much in aid from the United States, it did secure a certain amount of good will from China. Given its international isolation at the time of the Korean War, Beijing tried to cultivate a friendly relationship with Yangon. 53 In 1954, Burma and China agreed on the, 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', which indicated, 'China's public assurance that it would not interfere in Burma's internal affairs.' 54 In light of the pledges Beijing received from Burma that it would pursue a neutralist foreign policy, and that it was not a 'stooge' for imperial powers, Beijing displayed significant understanding of the KMT issue, and initially refrained from direct military interventions in Burma to remove any remnants of the KMT. It was not until late 1960 that the Burmese government invited the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take part in a coordinated military campaign that finally eradicated KMT troops from the country.
55 Also in 1960, Burma and China peacefully demarcated the border between them, in the process of which the PRC allegedly made more concessions. 56 Beijing also offered to purchase Burma's surplus rice, something the Americans had been unwilling to do. 57 In addition, in 1961 Beijing offered Yangon a loan of $84 million. 58 However, on the whole, Burma's foreign policy of neutralist open engagement brought it far less economic and military aid than Thailand's alliance-oriented approach.
Managing Domestic Communist Insurgencies
Both Thailand and Burma experienced domestic communist insurgencies during the Cold War period. Both the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and Communist Party of Burma (CPB) waged guerrilla warfare against their respective central governments. Their military campaigns differed in scale and intensity, but the ultimate success or failure of the CPT and CPB hinged on the Thai and Burmese governments' international relations. The alliance between Thailand and the United States ensured that Thailand possessed sufficient military capability for its counter-insurgent campaigns. Moreover, the Thai government's American military support and protection deterred the PRC from giving the CPT adequate support. Additionally, the normalisation of US-PRC relations in the early 1970s was beneficial to Thailand's counter-insurgent efforts, because Beijing started to wind down its support for the CPT. Burma's increasingly isolationist foreign policy, however, made it more subject to Beijing's intervention in its domestic politics.
The communist victory in China considerably boosted the morale of many other communist movements in Southeast Asia. Via ethnic Chinese ties, communist ideologies, propaganda materials, as well as material resources were spread throughout the region. 59 In 1952, the Phibun government passed the Anti Communist Act, by virtue of which it arrested and deported large numbers of left-wing overseas Chinese activist, shut down pro-communist Chinese newspapers, closed down Chinese language schools, and restricted immigration quotas from the PRC. 60 In retaliation, Beijing denounced the Phibun government as 'fascist and propped up by American imperialists'. 61 The Chinese government also accused Thailand of committing criminal acts against Chinese diaspora communities. 62 Yet throughout the 1950s, Beijing had offered little overt support for the CPT, which remained a thorn in the side of the Thai government. In the mid1960s, however, and especially after the American military commitment to Vietnam, Beijing intensified its support for a militarised 'people's war' in Thailand. 63 Thus, in 1965 the CPT started its armed struggle against the Bangkok 66 China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 also alleviated the pressure that Vietnam posed along the Thai border. 67 By 1980, the PRC had withdrawn its support for the CPT, which in subsequent years surrendered to the Thai government under a series of amnesty programmes. Under this situation, the geostrategic realignment of Indochina not only made China an important source of military support for Thailand, 68 but also both normalised and improved relations between the two governments to an extent that propelled Beijing's rolling back of its previous support for the CPT. The withdrawal of such external backing of the CPT empowered the Thai government to successfully suppress the internal security challenge that had plagued the Kingdom for decades.
Meanwhile, after Ne Win's coup in 1962 Burma's foreign policy orientation took an isolationist turn. The general's pursuit of 'the Burmese Way to Socialism' was evident in his isolating the country from the outside world, and how 'foreigners and their institutions were expelled, and even tourism was discouraged'. 69 Meanwhile, domestic radicalisation in China in the mid-1960s increased Beijing's willingness to export revolution to Burma. 70 Beijing mobilised the sizeable Chinese communities in Burma in support of the Cultural Revolution, which in 1967 resulted in a series of anti-Chinese riots in several cities. 71 These antiChinese riots, along with the Yangon government's isolationist foreign policy positions, rendered it vulnerable to punitive measures from Beijing, which began overtly supporting the CPB in its armed struggle against Yangon with the aim of destabilising Burma and discrediting the Ne Win government. The CCP provided financial, military, and personnel support for the CPB to establish 'liberated areas' covering more than 20 000 sq km along the Sino-Burmese border. 72 Between 1967 and 1973, China supplied the CPB with sufficient arms and ammunition to equip 10 000 soldiers. PLA military advisors were also dispatched to CPB-occupied areas. China supplied the CPB with RMB 2 million per year for general military expenditures, and Chinese hospitals along the border were opened for its use. Beijing also set up a radio station specifically for the CPB to disseminate propaganda. 73 This blatant support for the CPB's armed struggle on such a large scale clearly constituted open violation of Burmese sovereignty and territorial integrity, as set down in the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'. Yet, there was little the Yangon government could do to protect itself from Chinese hostility. As a secondary state that pursued an isolationist foreign policy and refused to engage with any of the great powers, upon the international environment becoming hostile, Burma's security interests took a huge blow. The CPB lasted until 1989, the Chinese side having withdrawn support in the mid-1980s, 74 although it had carried on substantially longer than that for the CPT. The demise of the CPB was mainly due to internal factional fighting rather than to the effectiveness of the Burmese military government. Indeed, the CPB's legacy lingers on, as its troops have fragmented into numerous ethnic rebel armies that continue to occupy several 'special regions' in the Shan and Kachin states, and continue to engage in occasional skirmishes with the Myanmar central government to this day. 75 
Myanmar and Thailand's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Reorientations
Since the end of Cold War, the United States' foreign policy goal in East Asia has changed from the prevention of communism to the gradual countering of the challenges posed by China's economic and military rise. Since the 1990s, the two countries have maintained a competitive relationship. From 'strategic competitors' to cooperation on the 'War on Terror', to the most recent American pivot/ rebalance to Asia, the bilateral relationship is complex and maintains a moderate level of competition. 76 Nowhere can we observe the same level of adversarial animosity that China and the United States displayed during the early years of the Cold War, and though this important relationship is certainly not that of a friendly one between allies, the competitive dynamic between the two could be reasonably described as moderate, although the level of competition has been increasing in more recent years. to construct a US$1.5 billion crude oil pipeline and a US$1 billion natural gas pipeline to connect the Kyaukphyu port in the Indian Ocean to Kunming, in China's Yunnan province. 81 The two pipelines satisfied to a great extent the Chinese government's energy security concerns, as both bypassed the Malacca Strait and gave China direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Acquiring access to these two pipelines gained China considerable strategic access in Myanmar.
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Thus, by relying closely on one great power, the military government in Myanmar attained what it desired in terms of security protection and economic investment from China. However, because this was a one-sided engagement, the secondary state lacked the capacity to bargain effectively with the great power. Indeed, China's preponderant position in Myanmar was described by some as a 'stranglehold', because many of the deals between the two countries were made on terms favourable to China. 83 Therefore, in order to improve its security interest, the Myanmar government's natural course of action was to reach out to the United States. For this to work, domestic political change had first to occur. Myanmar's active engagement with the United States has made it more capable of pushing back against China's perceived domination. In September 2011, the Myanmar government announced the suspension of construction work on the Myitsone Dam, a US$3.6 billion hydropower project to supply electricity to China. Another major Chinese investment, the Lepadaung copper mine, also faced heavy domestic criticism and resistance in Myanmar. In 2014, China's plan to build a railway linking Yunnan to Myanmar's Rakhine state was shelved due to the lack of interest from the Myanmar side. China now has growing worries that many of the investment projects negotiated with the previous military government might now be at risk of a renegotiation of terms, or at worst of cancellation. 86 Even the crude oil pipeline project was delayed, the first tanker having been filled only in April 2017, despite the pipeline's nominal opening two years previously. This competition with the United States over Myanmar also meant that China could not afford to lose further ground, but it seemed the country could do little to make Myanmar comply with its demands. Retaliation carried the risk of pushing the country further into the embrace of the United States, which is obviously not in China's national interest. It was this situation that prompted Beijing's diplomatic charm offensive towards Myanmar, expressed in a flurry of high-level visits between the two countries after the Myanmar-US thaw. 87 At the same time, the Chinese side reached out to the then opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), by holding consultations and inviting party members to visit China. This culminated in Aung San Suu Kyi's visit to China in June 2015, before her party's victory in the national elections. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also the first major foreign dignitary to visit Myanmar after the inauguration of the new civilian president U Htin Kyaw in April 2016. 88 In fact, Suu Kyi has visited Beijing several times since coming to power. Especially since the Rohingya crisis in the Rakhine State in 2017, 89 Suu Kyi has expressed appreciation for Beijing's support for her government, for example by stating, 'China and Myanmar will be good neighbours forever with fraternal spirit' during a recent meeting with the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister.
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Bilateral trade continues to increase since Myanmar's political transition. In 2015, China remained Myanmar's largest import partner, and the country's total imports from China stood at US$3.04 billion. 91 Myanmar's exports to China have gathered pace due to completion of the two pipelines, having skyrocketed to US$7.7 billion in 2014. 92 The volume of Chinese investment in Myanmar dropped significantly during 2012-2014, reflecting China's concern about the long-term feasibility and safety of many of its projects in the country during the initial years of uncertain political transition. However, Chinese investment in the fiscal year 2015/2016 quickly rebounded to US$3.3 billion. 93 Thus, by ditching its isolationist foreign policy during the post-Cold War period and engaging solely with China, the Myanmar government benefited from Chinese security protection and economic investment. Yet the terms of that arrangement were nonetheless perceived as non-optimal. By actively reaching out to the United States and thus engaging with both great powers, Myanmar dramatically improved its national interests by maintaining its cherished national autonomy but without forfeiting its ongoing beneficial economic relations with China.
As for Thailand, since the Sino-US rapprochement and the US pullout from Vietnam the country has always maintained cordial relationships with both the United States and China, despite maintaining its security alliance with the former. 94 As a non-claimant in the South China Sea, Thailand has no direct conflict of interest with China as regards territorial disputes. Thailand rather treats the relationship with China as an economically beneficial one. In the immediate aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, during which Thailand took a financial beating, the Chinese government's pledge not to devalue the RMB while committing US$1 billion to the international bailout of Thailand earned Beijing a positive image in Bangkok. 95 It was also during the 1997 Financial Crisis that the Thai state and society developed discontent toward the United States owing to Washington's reluctant and minimalist support for Thailand which, 'upset many people in Thailand and undermined the perception of true friendship and leadership to the Thais'. 96 In the years that ensued, Thailand has embraced a closer political and economic relationship with a rising China. For example, according to some sources, more than 1500 bilateral visits by government officials at all levels took place in the two years after the 1997 crisis. 97 In 1999, Thailand and China signed the Joint Declaration on the Cooperation Program of the 21st century, wherein both sides pledged military cooperation and further economic ties. 98 In 2012, Thailand and China further signed a series of agreements on building a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Closer economic engagement between the two countries has translated into China vying with Japan to be Thailand's top trading partner. 99 In addition, China is now Thailand's largest source of foreign tourists, more than 8 million Chinese citizens having visited Thailand annually over the past couple of years, so making a significant contribution to the Thai economy. 100 Thailand has effectively pursued a hedging strategy whereby it combines active economic engagement with China with continual political and military relations with the United States, just like other Southeast Asian countries. 101 In addition, by actively engaging with both China and the United States, Thailand has managed to resist political pressure from the United States as a result of its domestic political instabilities and recent military coups d'états.
Since the start of the 21st century, Thailand has experienced domestic instability, with competing rallies and counter-rallies between political forces that are loosely defined as 'yellow shirts' and 'red shirts'. 102 Such grassroots confrontations reflect the power struggles between the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and supporters of the royalist forces which prompted the military's takeover of the government twice, in 2006 and 2014. In particular, the most recent coup by General Prayuth Chan-o-cha has created a domestic political environment of deteriorating civil liberties and human rights violations, particularly evident in the draconian use of the lèse majesté law in dealing with political dissidents. 103 Thailand's domestic political regression has created a problem in its relations with the United States, which is no longer as tolerant or supportive of military coups there as it was during the Cold War years.
Officially, the United States government downgraded its military relations with Thailand, cancelled some of its military aid, and criticised the political situation in Thailand. However, US pressure, albeit feeble, had little impact on the Thai government, which actively courted Chinese support. On December 19, 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang became the most high-profile foreign leader to visit Thailand since the coup in May. 104 A few days later, Thai Prime Minister Prayut flew to Beijing to meet with Chinese president Xi Jinping. Xi said during the meeting that both countries 'should continue to show mutual understanding and support on issues concerning each other's core interests'. 105 In addition to the closer political relations between Bangkok and Beijing, both countries have also stepped up military cooperation. Thailand has purchased submarines, tanks and other military equipment from China, and both countries have carried out the joint military exercise, Blue Strike, which in 2016 was considered, 'the most comprehensive exercise the two have ever had, including land and sea operations, and humanitarian relief training'. means that the United States cannot afford to alienate the current Thai government by exerting pressure that could push Thailand further into China's embrace. 110 Thus, the United States has treaded carefully in its dealings with the Thai government, and the annual military exercise, Cobra Gold, continued to take place in 2016, and again in 2017, despite earlier indications that the United States might cancel it. 111 After Donald Trump became the new President, relations between the two countries further improved, and in October 2017 Prayut visited the White House, the first Thai Prime Minister to have done so in 12 years.
112 Therefore, by keeping an open engagement with China and the United States, Thailand has managed to preserve its autonomy amid US pressure on its domestic political changes.
Conclusion
These comparisons of three of Thailand and Myanmar's respective alignment choices since the end of WWII demonstrate the crucial intermix between domestic politics and international structural factors. Owing to their unique political histories and domestic power contests, the two countries pursued different foreign policy choices during the initial years of the Cold War. Thailand relied on a close alliance with the United States, while Myanmar, then Burma, stayed neutral. Such initial choices certainly had a lingering effect on later government. We have seen that after 1962 the Ne Win government carried the neutralist policy further still to one of self-isolation.
As to Thailand's case, the alliance relationship certainly empowered the country's military, leading to a succession of military governments during the Cold War that further entrenched Thailand's foreign policy orientation towards Washington. Domestic political crises in Myanmar, however, eventually pushed the military government first to seek a closer engagement with China, so as to fend off Western pressure on its government, and then, two decades later, to seek re-engagement with the United States in efforts to balance China's preponderance. After its alliance with the United States, Thailand stayed close to the American side through to the Sino-US rapprochement. But since the end of Cold War, and the divergence of Thailand and the US's interests in the region, Thailand has pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy. 113 In the wake of the country's recent political regression, Thailand's military government has pushed hard towards a close engagement with China in efforts to fend off American pressure with regard to its domestic political problems. Thus, domestic politics should certainly not be ignored in an analysis of secondary states' foreign policy making. Although explanations based on domestic politics tend to be of an idiosyncratic nature, we nevertheless need to pay more attention to the intertwined nature of domestic political contestation and foreign policymaking.
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After being chosen, however, these foreign policies had different consequences for the countries' respective national interests. Indeed, during times of intense competition among great powers, such as the early Cold War period, Thailand's active engagement with the United States served its national interests well, evident in the handsome material benefits it received in return. Furthermore, after the intense competition between the United States and China subsided, Thailand's engagement with both China and the United States helped its domestic anticommunist counter-insurgency. In contrast, Burma's neutralist foreign policy aroused the United States' mistrust, as witnessed by its cautious and reluctant approach towards providing aid for the Yangon government. Worse still, Burma's isolationism since the early 1960s had also made it a pawn in the PRC's export of revolution abroad by virtue of its overt support for CPB insurgencies. Since the end of the Cold War, therefore, the pursuance of an open engagement with both China and the United States has proven the best option for such countries' maintenance of their national autonomy, as the case studies of Myanmar and Thailand show.
This article makes the following contributions. Theoretically, it provides a general guideline for scholars and policymakers analyses and assessments of secondary states' foreign policy choice outcomes under different circumstances of great power competition. The article also augments the general literature on the alignment behaviour of secondary states, especially the recent burgeoning scholarship on the East Asian context of hedging. Given the ongoing and potential intensification of competition between the United States and China for primacy in the Asia Pacific region, scholars have given further attention to how secondary states in the region would react to different scenarios of changes in bilateral relations between the two great powers. 115 The detailed comparative case studies of Myanmar and Thailand's foreign relations since the end of WWII thus communicate with this set of literature on the merits of hedging under changing contexts. However, as this article has emphasised, acknowledgement of the crucial importance of domestic politics in secondary states is essential to understanding why these countries make and change their alignment policies. The dramatic shift in the Philippines' foreign policy stance towards China after the election of Rodrigo Duterte as the country's new president in 2016 is a case in point. 116 This article's findings shed light on how we should appraise the contemporary regional alignment situation in Southe Asia. In the current environment of Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia, as long as the competition remains moderate, it seems that a hedging strategy would produce the best national interest outcome.
